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FOREWORD
The authors reassess the barriers to Islamic radicalization in the Republic of Kazakhstan. They provide
crucial analysis and findings for policymakers seeking
to engage with the country, while also presenting important insights into the historical and cultural impediments in the path of radicalizing its youth. Despite
the proximity of the Central Asian Republics to Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism, unlike its
neighbors, Kazakhstan has remained relatively stable
and low risk in the face of international terrorism and
extremism. This monograph examines some of the
reasons as to why this is the case, proving that early
judgements offered by commentators concerning Kazakhstan’s experience of domestic politically inspired
violence in 2011-12, exaggerated the potential threat
of growing Islamic radicalization.
For 70 years, Kazakhstan underwent a forceful and
externally imposed secularization and was maintained
rigidly under Soviet rule, with no official state support
for organized religion. Yet, there were mosques functioning in the Soviet era, and the people in its territory maintained their own religious beliefs. However,
secularization left its own effects on the religious identity of the Kazakhs, and today the country is opening
up to Islam by treading its own path as part of the
Muslim community.
This monograph presents one of the most underresearched subjects of modern Kazakhstan: examining attitudes and approaches to Islam. It investigates
the historical roots and perspectives of a nomadic lifestyle and how they are being changed and developed
on the way toward what many today understand
as traditional Islam. One of the main questions the
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authors of this monograph pose is what traditional
Islam means for modern day Kazakhstan.
Islam in Kazakhstan merges and intertwines preIslamic traditions with the rituals of Shamanism and
Tengrianism that once existed in the wider steppes
where a nomadic lifestyle took hold precluding the
people from building stationary worship places. Very
few scholars in Kazakhstan are currently undertaking serious research on this subject. Meanwhile, many
foreign observers suggest that Central Asian countries are undergoing a thorough and rapid Islamization process. This analysis provides some answers
to that assumption. How does Islam in Kazakhstan
differ from Islam in Turkey, Qatar, and Malaysia, for
example? What makes it so distinctive? Is that particular type or variety of Islam today encouraging young
men to travel to Syria and Afghanistan?
This monograph is a soul-searching account of
what Islam means to the general population and how
it is perceived; it reveals deep internal development
of the post-Soviet society to embrace new ideas and
open up to the wider world of global integration and
cosmopolitanism. It discusses the specifics of how Islam has transformed, been adopted, modernized, and
accepted in the poly-ethnic, poly-cultural and polylinguistic environment of Kazakhstan. Then, it moves
from theory to practice in its empirical implementation, describing how Kazakhstan struggles against its
own specific types of terrorism and extremism, and
how it continues to pursue this.
Terrorism and extremism are commonly discussed
national security issues in Central Asia, frequently
tied to developments in Afghanistan or the emerging
threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The authors, however, trace the roots of Kazakhstan’s
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counterterrorist strategy and assess the actual experience of acts of political violence in the country in
2011-12, and how this impacted new means and approaches to mitigating the risks of domestic terrorism.
They conclude that those acts of violence, while its
perpetrators often claimed inspiration from international Islamic terrorism, were carried out by criminal
elements rather than homegrown terrorists. Nevertheless, the experience of these acts of violence, including
suicide bombings targeting security forces, was used
by the state to recraft measures and policies aimed at
reducing the danger of terrorist groups making inroads into the country.
In fact, the fundamental value of this analysis lies
in the effort the authors make to avoid looking at these
complex issues from a foreign or Euro-Atlantic perspective; they seek to assess these themes from within,
offering a more realistic insight into the evolution of
religion in Kazakhstan, as well as its related security
policies. Therefore, this monograph will be of interest
to decisionmakers trying to find ways to deepen and
strengthen ties with Kazakhstan and support the country’s security, and to scholars investigating post-Soviet
transition. Too often, these issues are stove-piped with
analysts assessing the various issues in a compartmentalized manner. But here, in this work, drawing upon
indigenous sources the authors integrate their analysis
of history, religion, political violence, and criminality,
and their interconnections to security policy in a userfriendly way. The result speaks for itself and presents
readers with a sober and genuine view of the security
challenges stemming from radical Islam, in the context of identifying the numerous barriers standing in
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the way of tipping growing numbers of the country’s
youth into transnational radical Islamist movements.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Central Asia is one of the most complex and underassessed regions in the world and has been experiencing an exacerbation or activation of radical Islamic
movements over the last decade or so. To some extent,
extremism has shown its various facets in all Central
Asian states.
The general overviews listing the roots of the Islamic radicalization usually explain it by several
combined factors. These complex processes include
increasing urbanization, institutional and individual
corruption, the growing gap between rich and poor,
the inability of the state to provide security, corruption in the law enforcement agencies, poor functioning of the state religious bodies, inefficient power
structures, and a limited scope for citizens to influence
decisionmaking resulting in lower trust in the authorities, as well as other factors. The authoritarian regimes
of Central Asia gave rise to boiling anger and discontent among their populations. For people unable
to defend their rights and interests, religion may be
viewed as an escape from their minimized existence.
However, all those factors described were more or less
present much earlier. Even more paradoxically, the
extent of the Islamic radicalization taking place at that
point did not occur while the Taliban was in power in
Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan, being the most stable and safe country
in the region, witnessed a series of alleged extremistterrorist acts since 2011. The number of Islamic activists has grown, particularly in rural areas. As an official response to that, Kazakhstan continues to improve
its legislation on combating terrorism and extremism.
However, since this experience of domestic “politi-
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cal violence” in 2011-12, the country has suffered no
major incidents.
This analysis begins by providing an overview of
historic roots and identity of “Kazakh Islam,” while
attempting to explain how it emerged. Then it describes the nature of connection and influence reaching Kazakhstan from neighboring North Caucasus
and Afghanistan and how it affects radicalization of
the youth. Then main reasons for misleading assumptions are closely examined to identify how Kazakhstan
is viewed from the outside world. Separate sections
explore the state structures and the role of the state
overseeing the issues regarding Islam and its practices. Special attention is drawn upon banned extremist
groups, their specifics, and the country’s experience
of political violence in 2011-12, as well as the state’s
response to the acts of violence.

xii

REASSESSING THE BARRIERS TO
ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN
HISTORICAL ROOTS AND IDENTITY
OF “KAZAKH ISLAM”
The Islamic religion came to the steppes of Kazakhstan around the 13th to 14th centuries. However,
Islam did not embed itself deeply enough to become
the overwhelming religion of the Kazakh tribes. The
first time the Sharia law was introduced was during
the rule of Khan (provincial governor) in 1815. The
main missionaries in the Kazakh steppes were Tatar
mullahs that tried to convert nomadic people to Islam.
The initial functions of mullahs and imams were to
teach and enlighten those who wanted to learn voluntarily. It is important to note that Islam was not
imposed forcefully. Islam had become an official religion of the medieval Khanates of the Turkic world,
but it was never fully accepted with all its dogmas.
Attendance at the mosque and five daily prayers remained conditional. Islam took deep roots in big cities and towns among traders and crafters; however,
the rest of the population followed both Islam and
Tengrianism, sometimes interchangeably.1
As Shokan Valikhanov writes, Islam had decoded
the Shamanism of the Kazakhs. At the same time, modern Kazakhs worship their ancestors and their spirits
in addition to visiting sacred places, which completely contradicts traditional Islamic rules.2 Islam was
popular as an underground movement during Soviet
times, and many Kazakhs remained, observing their
religious duties behind closed doors. In the Soviet period of the 1920-30s in the Central Asian region, there
were 20 times more unregistered mosques and three
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to four times more illegal clergy than official statistics
showed.3 Since Kazakhstan gained its independence,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey expressed the biggest interest in providing religious education and
funding for the construction of new mosques.4
The branch of Islam used in Kazakhstan is the
Hanafi Madhhab, which is Sunni. The Hanafi is the
largest of four existing schools in Islam (30 percent of
Muslims worldwide) and is the most liberal one. Today, 72 percent of Kazakhstan’s population are followers of Islam.5 Other sources claim there are currently
11 million Muslims (out of 16 million), belonging to 24
nationalities.6
Kazakh Islam currently presents a mixture of the
ancient traditions (Tengrianism, Shamanism) and traditional type of Islam (Sunni). Sometimes Kazakhs
combine those two types when performing certain
rituals. Nowadays, there is a clear intertwining of the
Old (Tengrianism and Shamanistic) beliefs with the
traditional ways of Islam. Most Kazakhs would be
unable to tell where one ends and the other begins.
For example, the belief in Aruak (the spirit of ancestors) coexists with the rules of Islamic burial where
women are banned from attending. One of the main
features of the so-called Kazakh Islam is that the majority of the Kazakh population have a very fragmentary knowledge of real Islam. Very few people in the
country speak Arabic in order to read the Koran in the
original language.
Nevertheless, going on the Hadj (a pilgrimage
to Mecca) became somewhat fashionable for certain
groups of people. For example, as of February 2013,
the price of a Hadj for Kazakhs varied from $3,500 to
$3,900.7 The average monthly wage is roughly $700.8
In other words, middle-class Kazakhs, not to mention
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working class, cannot easily afford such a trip, and either have to work hard to save the required amount or
borrow it in the form of credit.
Professor Saniya Edelbay from the Department of
Philosophy at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University
in Almaty, Kazakhstan, argues that “traditional” Islam
was never inherent in Kazakh culture. Kazakh women’s traditional dress has nothing in common with
how true Islamic women should dress, like covering
the arms and face.9 Furthermore, Rasul Zhumaly, a
specialist in oriental studies and lecturer at the Suleyman Demirel University, believes that for the past few
years Kazakhstan has been experiencing Islamophobia due to the number of cases involving terrorism.10
It is widely assumed that all Kazakhs are automatically Muslims; however, there are Kazakhs belonging
to other religions even though the number is low.
In the immediate wake of the collapse of the Soviet
Union, some Kazakhs joined Christian, Buddhist, and
other religions.11 However, there were many who
found themselves in an ideological vacuum without
being able to identify their religious identity. Nurlan
Ayupov writes that Kazakhs being lost and confused
as to their identity may revert to their initial roots:
Tengrianism. Most Kazakh traditions and rites stem
from this tradition. Tengrianism shows the way out of
the dead-end where Turks found themselves driven
by other world religions, and the rebirth of Tengrianism would lead to a complete change of mentality.12
The Kazakh model of Islam had adjusted itself to
Tengrianism, merging Islamic and Tengrianism traditions and ideas, which later became known as Turkic
Islam or Central Asian Islam or folk Islam.13 Moreover, Tengrianism can position itself as a cultural and
civilizational self-identity factor of Kazakh people and
other Turkic nations.
3

INFLUENCE FROM THE NORTH CAUCASUS
AND AFGHANISTAN
On April 15, 2013, Boston had witnessed its first
terrorist attack after September 11, 2001 (9/11), perpetrated by two amateurish Chechen brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Immediate investigation
discovered that prior to arriving in the United States,
the family lived in Kyrgyzstan for some period, which
led to certain speculations about close connections between North Caucasus (NC) and Central Asia (CA).
The matter was worsened by the fact that, in the aftermath of the bombings, two Kazakhstani exchange
students, Dias Kadyrbayev and Azamat Tazhayakov,
were charged with tampering with evidence and obstruction of justice, as well as conspiracy. They threw
away the backpack that contained fireworks, the powder that was used to make a bomb, and the laptop belonging to one of the brothers. It was proved that the
Kazakhstanis did that on the request of Dzhokhar. In
late-July 2014, Azamat Tazhayakov had been found
guilty; Dias Kadyrbayev will face his trial in September 2015. Both of them may face up to 25 years, plus a
significant amount of fines and deportation.14
In spite of this particular set of events, to say that
there are strong links between Kazakhstan and North
Caucasus is far-fetched. At no point was it suggested
that the Kazakh students helped the Chechens out of
sympathy for their cause or took any direct part in
preparations for the bombings.
One of the initial links between CA and NC started when former Soviet leader Josef Stalin deported
Chechen people to the territories of modern day
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944. There is still
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some Chechen diaspora living in Western Kazakhstan, and it was from there (Atyrau) that radical Islamists recruited Kazakhs to fight in the NC.
However, today there is no direct connection reported about the insurgency in NC (Dagestan, Ingushetia, etc.) and terrorist acts taking place in Kazakhstan. The ideology, methods, and purposes are
entirely different.
Jacob Zenn, an analyst of African and Eurasian affairs for The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC,
suggests that many so-called Kazakhstanis that were
captured or killed in the NC were actually from the
ethnic Chechen generation that was once deported
from Chechnya and who may still hold Kazakh passports and citizenship.15 There are accounts that Kazakh
nationals captured in the NC are ethnic Caucasians
(predominantly Chechens) holding Kazakhstani citizenship. Those are actually third or fourth generation
Chechens that were deported from the NC by Stalin
and became Kazakhstanis.16
The current epicenter of the insurgency in the NC
is Dagestan, where the presence of a small number
of Kazakh fighters was reported between 2009 and
2011. However, that does not prove the case for extensive help or even influence from Kazakhstan. The
coordinator of the Center for Security Programs in Astana, Talgat Mamyraymov, notes that the idea of the
NC radical influence on CA is widely overestimated.
The roots of terrorism for Kazakhstan are located not
abroad, but within the country itself; it lies within the
domestic social political situation rather than imported
extremist Islamist views.
If anything, the ties between CA and NC radicals
are mainly formed in Afghanistan. After the drawdown of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
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forces in 2014, both CA and NC terrorists might divert
their attention to the Central Asian region. But their
motives would be far from clear, lacking the drivers
present in their Afghanistan campaign against “foreign invaders,” and intrinsically linked to long established nexus of crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.
The former head of the Centre for Counter-terrorism Programs, and political expert Erlan Karin
believes that militants who earlier functioned around
the Afghan-Pakistan border are now becoming more
active near the Afghan-Tajik border. The Afghan drug
trade grew to become an everlasting link between the
Talibs, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and
other Islamists, including al-Qaeda. Kazakhstan closely borders with Russia’s Bashkortostan Province (300
kilometers [km] away), where in Aktobe in October
2011, four Salafists were convicted for police shootings. Bashkortostan Islamists use the Kazakh route for
transportation to Afghanistan and Pakistan.17
REASONS FOR MISLEADING ASSUMPTIONS
Today international Islamic movements are attracting the youth, predominantly young men. With
increasing urbanization, there are mass movements
happening from villages to the cities. That, in turn,
increases the urban population of the cities and adds
a critical mass of young men and women, who, upon
arrival, sometimes cannot find a job or are unable to
enter any educational establishment. Such groups become automatically exposed to certain religious vulnerabilities, also taking into account that they had no
chance to receive any previous religious education.
There are, of course, local mosques in the villages;
however, the quality of the mullahs preaching there is
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in question. Also, some of the prisons in Kazakhstan
serve as a perfect recruitment ground for radicalization attempts. One of the radicalization sources stems
from imprisoning alleged Salafists that spread their
extremist perceptions attracting the disenfranchised
youth.18 Radicals serve terms together with common
criminals, and that is something that needs to be
amended by the authorities.
The United States believes that Kazakhstan uses
the threat of radicalization to deal with the political
opposition.19 It is also assumed that Kazakh law enforcers have low capabilities to distinguish between
extremists and criminals.20 One of the reasons the
extremists turn out to be popular in CA is explained
by the lack and/or absence of the knowledge about
real Islam. It is blamed on the officials and governments for not providing adequate information to the
population. According to this view, it is very easy
to drive the moderate but inexperienced Muslims
toward radicalization.
Officials in all CA states became accustomed to
inadvertently blaming foreign governments for their
disruptive influence. That in itself reflects the Soviet
mentality of the elite when the main responsibility
for unpleasant events is directed toward an external
force. However, there are facts and figures showing
that external forces are at play as well. For example,
Kyrgyzstan is too economically weak to fund and
sustain the increasing number of new mosques being
built all across the country. Some experts believe it is
being directly funded by Saudi Arabia and sometimes
Turkey.21
Another bias concerning the reasons for radicalization in CA from the Russian point of view is the
assumption that Central Asian governments are too
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weak and decentralized to keep a tight grip on power, which leads their populations to frustration and
search for enemies. The extent of such arguments is
highly questionable, since each Central Asian country
needs to be looked upon and analyzed separately.
Some Russian experts tend to see the roots for Islamism in CA in the poor social economic conditions
of the region, driving young people to an alternative
lifestyle. In other words, Russians blame Central Asian
governments for creating the volatile atmosphere of
distrust of the youth in their own authorities. For example, Aleksandr Vavilov from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Russia goes as far as suggesting that
one of the main reasons for Islamic radicalization in
CA is the weakening and possible loss by the people
of the “worldwide culture and civilization” as it is
reflected in the Russian language.22
Russian sources frequently blame the alleged
growing radicalization of the Central Asian region on
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deterioration
of their educational and social systems. But the issue
looks more complicated than this overly simplified
politicized narrative implies. With the elimination of
the Iron Curtain, Kazakh people became more open
to different kinds of influences and knowledge. The
entire Islamic world had been closed to CA countries
for more than 70 years, and now the region is fully
exposed to whatever ways of Islam the others want to
bring and/or impose. Nevertheless, one expert from
the Diplomatic Academy claimed that Russia’s position in its foreign policy strategy is based on the fact
that all former Soviet Republics are under the natural
exclusive zone of Russian influence, due to its cultural
and historical ties, and especially due to existing in the
Russian information space.23
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Perhaps it is worthwhile to consider that Kazakhstan had turned into such a vulnerable state for Islamic
influences precisely because it was previously closed.
Now the population is in a state of permanent confusion and disorientation as to what real Islam is and
how to pursue it. But before that, Kazakhstan’s government and leadership should think about whether
the country needs to be guided toward awareness of
what constitutes real Islam. That remains a huge open
question for government and society.
Kazakhstan’s leading expert on Afghanistan, Sultan Akimbekov, suggests the theory that the radicalization movement starts when some forces are directly
targeting the existing synergy of the traditional power
distribution that is between secular and spiritual authorities. In other words, if some forces plan to modernize the nation and governance structures in a way
that damages or inflicts serious changes upon the traditional status quo, there will always be forces opposing it and trying to turn back the process. He argues
that it is precisely the case with Afghanistan, when
the 1978 April revolution brought forth the National
Democratic Party extreme in its aspirations to modernize the backward Afghan society, which, in turn, led
to many complications, including the Soviet invasion
and prolonged civil war.24 However, the case cannot
be compared with Kazakhstan due to several reasons.
Kazakhstan has never been ruled and governed under
Sharia law. The distribution of power had a predominantly secular character with mullahs or imams never
interfering into the state of political affairs. Moreover,
when the Soviet expansion began from 1917 onwards,
the changes they introduced to the patriarchal society
never took the shape of an armed or extreme opposition from the local masses. The character of the resistance held a different nature and approach.
9

Modern Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy
requires the country to maintain good balanced relations with everyone including the Muslim countries.
Kazakhstan is pursuing those goals. Constitutionally,
however, Kazakhstan is a secular state. The present
leadership encourages the country to stay secular
by introducing restrictive religious legislation and
other measures.
On June 29, 2014, the newly emerged Islamic State
(IS), formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL), and by some as the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), included Kazakhstan along with
other CA states as part of the territory called Khorasan. Unsurprisingly, that caused a negative reaction
from both the expert community and from the ordinary population. It is assumed that a number of Kazakhstani militants who first fought in Syria can now
also be found among the founders of IS. The exact
number of Kazakhstani nationals is unknown. To the
question of whether ISIL might present any serious
threat to Kazakhstan, most of the interviewed analysts
answered negatively but cautiously.25
As things stand today, Kazakhstan presents only a
small and distant fraction of the grand-scale ISIL plan
to unite all sovereign countries considered to be somewhat Muslim. The implementation of such a plan remains to be seen.
STATE STRUCTURES OVERSEEING
ISLAM IN KAZAKHSTAN
There are two main governmental bodies in charge
of the Islamic religion on a state scale: the Agency on
Religious Affairs and the Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan Muslims. Today, one can say that the state
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strictly controls the religious sphere, some may argue
that it is overwhelmingly strict. That also includes the
requirement for official registration of any religious
entities (organizations, gatherings, unions, etc.), appointing and monitoring imams, registering mosques,
and checking religious practices.26
In addition, the state attempts to control any kind
of religious literature being imported into the country. All these types of measures originate from the
Soviet era, and all Central Asian governments follow
these measures to one extent or another. For example,
Kazakhstan’s Agency on Religious Affairs had studied around 2,000 websites, and consequently 950 of
them were blocked due to their promotion of violent
extremism in 2010.27
The Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Kazakhstan
is an authoritative institution, not a spiritual one, according to one of the country’s experts on Islam, Alma
Sultangalieva. She also argues that the religious field
should not be monopolized as the government tries to
suppress other religious dissidents.28 This argument
can be supported by the multiple cases of the official
Muslim clergy incompetence. For example, one of the
reasons the youth start following “pure Islam” is the
inaccessibility of the official imams to whom they cannot speak. Usually imams are too busy to talk face-toface, handling other religion-related things like weddings, burials, or other rituals. Sometimes youths also
feel too shy to ask questions. Disaffected youth then
go to those with whom they can talk and have time to
reply to their questions. Unfortunately, those volunteers may not always have good intentions.
There are examples of Russian-speaking Kazakhs
visiting mosques and trying to take part in prayers
and listening to preaching. Part of the problem, how-
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ever, lies in the fact that the preaching is in Kazakh,
and there is no available translation. Thus, many of
those that speak Russian start addressing “other”
sources. According to one visitor, 70 percent of people
who regularly attend the mosque are happy to “translate” the preaching, but in a way that suits them.29
One of the examples of confusion is suggested by the
fact that there are contradictions between fatwas issued by the Spiritual Directorate and some of the national traditions that are fixed in the Cultural Heritage
state program.
The 9th grade of high school has a subject called
“The Basis of Religions,” where students are supposedly taught basic information.30 Among citizens writing their comments to the agency are those who are
concerned by the increasing number of the Islamic
fanatics wearing long beards and hijabs, particularly
in educational institutions such as the Nur Mubarak
Egypt University.31 Many religious fanatics take the
words of high level officials, such as Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev and twist their meaning. For
example, Nazarbayev had said that “Our roots are
Turkic, and our religion is Islam.”32 For many ardent
followers, such a statement might be enough to assume that the Head of State is encouraging Kazakhs
to take up the green banners of Islam.
As of December 2012, there were 2,228 mosques
functioning in Kazakhstan that were re-registered by
the Spiritual Directorate.33 There are only 10 madrasas functioning under the supervision of the Spiritual
Directorate. According to national legislation, there
are specially designated places (churches, mosques,
and certain shop networks) where ordinary Kazakh
citizens are able to obtain religious literature, including translations of the Koran. So unless it is illegally
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distributed, one cannot easily acquire even the Koran
and other related books. It is a curious fact that in the
Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan (approved
in April 2010), there is not even a single word mentioning Islam as the leading religion of the population.
However, there are provisions in the field of interconfessional relations:
The unifying principle of religion, prevention of the
negative impact of the religious factor on the state
of interethnic relations should become an important
direction of strengthening national unity. In order to
achieve the goal it is necessary to:
•	develop partnership between state and religious
associations in order to develop interreligious dialogue and mutual understanding, strengthen the
stability in society;
•	provide cooperation and joint work of state bodies and religious associations in addressing such
social objectives as strengthening moral societal
guidelines; increasing role of the family; combating drug addiction, alcoholism, distribution of the
youth crime, and homelessness;
•	
use spiritual values of traditional religions to
strengthen moral fabric of society, enhancing religious literacy of population;
•	execution of a systematic awareness raising activities with the public, especially with the youth, in
order to counter the spread of extremism and radicalism;
•	
support nongovernmental organizations, whose
activity is aimed at informing the population about
pseudo-religious associations and providing psychological, legal, and judicial assistance to victims
of these associations.
Due to the stated measures, religion should facilitate
enhancement of a correct system of moral values,
ideas of tolerance, unity, and harmony in society.34
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State control has also tightened its grip by arranging the cuts in Kazakh students going abroad to study
at theological institutions. In 2011, there were 500 such
students. Afterwards, 130 students returned home
after local authorities sent the relevant messages to
the families. Today no Kazakh student can enroll in
any Saudi Arabian institution without the formal approval of the Ministry of Education of Kazakhstan.
The same scheme would also extend to other potential
“suspicious” enrollments in countries such as Turkey,
Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others.35
BANNED EXTREMIST GROUPS
State-level efforts to counter religious extremism
as a possible breeding ground for terrorism are by no
means new in Kazakhstan. The Law of the Republic
of Kazakhstan “On Countering Extremism” (February
18, 2005, No. 31) empowers the Supreme Court with
the authority to designate organizations banned as
either terrorist or extremist groups. This is set out in
Article 8, sections 1-4, and depends on state security
bodies furnishing the court with sufficient evidence
against any organization for inclusion on such a list. It
also recognizes the right to include groups banned by
foreign states. Since then, the list of banned organizations has become a matter of public record.36 However,
this simply formalized an already established practice
to use the Supreme Court to ban such organizations.
On October 12, 2006, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court
approved a revised list of banned terrorist organizations in the country and Prosecutor-General Rashid
Tusupbekov released the list. Astana banned the
IMU, Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT), Jamaat of Central
Asian Mujahedins, Islamic Party of Eastern Turkestan,

14

Kurdistan Workers Party, Boz Kurt, Lashkar-e-Toiba,
Social Reforms Society (Kuwait), Asbat-an-Asar (Israel), al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood
(Egypt).37 Some of these groups were already banned
in the country since 2004, and, indeed, were recognized internationally as terrorist organizations. Critics of the list said that the Muslim Brotherhood and
Lashkar-e-Toiba did not operate in Kazakhstan on a
level sufficient to justify their inclusion in the list of
banned organizations. Saulebek Zhamkenuly, press
secretary for the Prosecutor-General’s Office, said:
It does not mean all these organizations are active
in Kazakhstan. The decision to ban them is a preventive measure. These organizations are considered as
terrorist in Russia, the US, Turkey, Uzbekistan and
Pakistan.38

On November 17, 2006, the Supreme Court added
an additional organization to this list; the East Turkestan Liberation Organization.39 By February 16, 2009,
President Nazarbayev had signed into law a ban on
206 items of religious literature.
It is worthwhile to trace briefly Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court decisions since it first announced a ban of
four organizations on October 15, 2004. By March 2005,
that list had grown to 11 organizations before reaching 13 in late-2006. Since then, this list has reached 16,
with one group (HT) designated as extremist and the
other 15 considered to be terrorist groups. The court of
Atyrau on November 25, 2011, added the Soldiers of
the Caliphate, and again it is important to understand
this as a preventative measure.40
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RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
Overall, 3,088 religious organizations representing 17 confessions were re-registered as of October
25, 2012. Although the Law on Religion in October
2011 provoked controversy, it also generated reliable
statistics on the breakdown of religious organizations
in the country, as shown in Figure 1. However, Western human rights-based critiques of this law actually
overlook the fact that it serves as a major legal barrier
to further radicalization of the country’s youth. This
is based on the fact that the law bans religious tracts
or religious activity without permission, and restricts
it to designated places. In practical terms, someone
trying to promote radical Islam cannot distribute their
literature openly in the country’s shops or in areas
where people gather in large numbers. This arguably drives the activity underground where, paradoxically, it is far easier to monitor, though there may
be mistakes and underestimation concerning some
individuals or groups.41
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of political Islam or
radical Islamist groups operating within CA is neither
new nor particularly dependent upon external influences. Such militant networks were present during the
Soviet era such as Adolat (Justice), Tawba (Repentance),
and Islam Lashkalari (Warriors of Islam), and scholars
have linked their re-emergence in CA with the political reforms initiated in the 1980s.42 However, the acts
of political violence in Kazakhstan in 2011-12 was a
new experience for the country. Yet, these events
need to be outlined and understood in their context
before tracing how the authorities respond and draw
conclusions as to the nature of this threat.
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No.

Confession/Denomination

As of January 1, 2011

As of October 25, 2012.

1

Islam

2,811

2,229

2

Orthodoxy

304

280

3

Pentecostal Churches

400

189

4

Evangelical Christian-Baptist

364

100

5

Catholicism

118

79

6

Jehovah's Witnesses

70

59

7

Presbyterian Churches

229

55

8

Seventh-Day Adventists

67

42

9

Evangelical Lutheran Church

32

13

10

Methodists

18

11

11

New Apostolic Church

47

8

12

Krishnaism

14

8

13

Bahai

20

6

14

Judaism

26

4

15

Buddism

4

2

16

Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (Mormons)

1

2

17

Mennonites

6

1

4,531

3,088

Total

Source: www.din.gov.kz/eng/religioznyeobedineniya/?cid=0&rid=691.

Figure 1. Religious Organizations Re-registered
as of October 25, 2012.
KAZAKHSTAN’S LIMITED EXPERIENCE OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 2011-12
Despite its closer defense and security cooperation with the United States and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) following 9/11 and official claims to have prevented acts of terrorism on
its territory, Kazakhstan had not been targeted successfully by international terrorist groups. Reports
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on the activities of the Kazakhstani security services
in the 1990s and 2000s frequently targeted members
of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, while other groups known to be
involved in terrorism were less prominent in the
reported disruption activities of the state security
agencies. This could sometimes prove to be contradictory. In 2004, for instance, the National Security
Committee (Komitet Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti or KNB)
claimed that they had shut down the Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahedins (JCAM). However, in 2006,
the KNB claimed to have disrupted a terrorist plot
orchestrated by JCAM members.43
Detailed case studies of these incidents are necessary in order to further frame an understanding of the
scale of this apparent outburst of violent activity in the
country. This must also be analyzed in context: in 22
years of independence, the country has experienced a
series of violent incidents over only an 18-month period. As these events unfolded, the authorities were
clearly taken by surprise, suggesting that the intelligence services and other security forces had little prior
warning or detailed understanding as to the type of
activists or perpetrators involved. This can be seen
in the first responders at the scene (only later were
KNB special forces deployed), as well as in some of
the weaknesses in the “groups” involved in their use
of violence. In other words, the authorities may have
rushed to label many of these incidents as “terrorist,”
when in fact they could be symptoms of other more
credible explanations.
Its first experience of anything remotely resembling a terrorist incident occurred on May 17, 2011, in
Aktobe. Rakhimzhan Makhatov, a 25-year-old, detonated a device, killing himself and wounding three
others at the entrance of the local headquarters of the
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KNB. The suicide bomber had alleged links with an
Islamic terrorist group. The incident was described as
“an act of revenge (or protest) against the treatment
of Islamic extremists in prison.” It has been reported
that adherents of Wahhabism in Kazakhstan’s prisons
had been tortured.44 On May 24, 2011, a car bombing
occurred in the capital Astana, targeting a KNB detention facility; the only causalities were the two men
inside the vehicle.
Dmitry Kelpler, the owner of the vehicle, and “Ivan
Cheremukhin” were both from the Pavlodar Province.
According to the local Internal Troops of the Ministry
for Internal Affairs (MVD), the latter’s passport was
stolen, and his real identity was confirmed as Sergei
Podkosov, a 34-year-old from the city of Pavlodar.45
Podkosov had a criminal record, and the authorities
disclosed that he had converted to Islam a few years
before the attack.46 No information was released on
Kelpler, but the reference to the past criminal record
and religion of the second individual held out a potential link to radical Islam. The authorities offered
no official link to any known terrorist group. The two
unrelated incidents in Aktobe and Astana were linked
only by the KNB targets.
As the authorities struggled to come to terms with
the country’s first experience of suicide bombings, a
fresh incident took place in the Aktobe Province between police and six suspects. On June 30, 2011, assailants shot two unarmed police officers in the village of Shubarshy in Aktobe Province. Police named
six suspects between the ages of 22-43 (Kuanysh Alimbetov, Akylbek Mambetov, Toktarbek Mambetov,
Bektemir Urazov, Miras Karazhanov, and Aybek
Dzhumagazin), and offered a reward of $100,000 for
information resulting in their capture. On July 2-3,
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the MVD launched a special operation to apprehend
the suspects deploying Sunkar and Berkut special forces. The operation failed to detain any suspects and left
one officer dead and three soldiers wounded. Shortly
afterwards, a KNB Arlan special forces unit arrived to
join the search. A joint operation was conducted near
the village of Kenkiyak close to Shubarshy on July 8,
killing nine and capturing two suspects and seizing
a number of weapons. One soldier from one of the
special forces units died in the operation.47 The only
linkage between these incidents and radical Islam apparently relates to the discovery of radical literature in
the trunk of a vehicle belonging to 22-year-old Talgat
Shakanov arrested on June 28 for possession of unregistered weapons. This arrest resulted in associates of
Shakanov retaliating by shooting the two policemen
on June 30. The incidents appear less to do with radical Islam than with criminality, and the motive for the
murder of the policemen was clearly revenge. First
Deputy Interior Minister Marat Demeuov dismissed
the assertion that Islamic radicalism was the cause:
“For several years, the criminal group had been stealing oil from a pipeline using religious ideas as a cover.” Shakanov’s banned literature is the only possible
link to radical Islamist ideology.48
Atryau, October 31, 2011: A Turning Point?
On October 31, 2011, two bombs exploded in
Atyrau, resulting in the death of the bomber and
damaging a regional government office as well as an
apartment building. The first of these devices was
placed in a garbage can near the local government office and resulted in blowing out some of its windows.
The second, an apparently bungled effort, was first
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reported as a “suicide bombing,” damaging the apartment building adjacent to the prosecutor’s office.49 A
previously unknown terrorist group Jund al-Khilafah
(Soldiers of the Caliphate, JK) claimed responsibility
for the attacks. The same “group” had earlier released
a video to protest a recently passed law on religion.
Astana’s law on religion on October 13 had banned
prayer in state buildings and unregistered religious
activity in the country, and required previously registered religious groups to re-register. JK “members,” as
such, claimed this was only a warning to the government and denied an intended suicide bombing. Yet,
the existence of the group has remained a mystery—it
may simply disguise a group of disaffected youths,
though some sources suggest the group is tied to the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.50 To date, this is
the only incident in Kazakhstan for which this alleged
group claimed responsibility, and its dead “members”
may in fact be its only real participants. The linkage between the incident and the claims about the existence
of the group have never been established, though by
late-November 2011, this “group” had been added to
an officially banned list.
In fact, some Western analysts appear to take seriously the existence of JK, compared with more sober
assessments by Kazakhstani analysts.51 This is based
on claims as to the existence of the group largely rooted in videos posted online from August 2011 to December 2011. This narrative purports that the group
“emerged with ties to Afghanistan and Pakistan.” It
represents an attempt by Kazakh diaspora militants
involved in fighting alongside the Taliban to unite under a Central Asian umbrella, but at best with unclear
aspirations.52
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Video evidence used to support such claims is less
than convincing. At best, it may represent a number of
ethnic Kazakhs who joined the Taliban insurgency in
Afghanistan, but it by no means offers a clear ideology
or explains what the “group” may have against the
authorities in Astana. The JK video claimed it opposed
the Law on Religion that was passed on October 11,
2011, because the law was an attempt to prevent Muslim worship in places of work and other public buildings; professed that it banned the wearing of headscarves; accused the government of allegedly closing
mosques; torturing Muslim prisoners in state prisons;
and called for the overthrow of President Nazarbayev,
following the violence at Zhanaozen where several civilians were killed. The latter actually had nothing to
do with extremism or terrorism but resulted from a
trade dispute and the over-reaction of security forces
to public disorder.53
While the court of Atyrau rushed to add this group
to the national list of banned extremist organizations
by late-November 2011, Kazakhstani analyses of this
alleged group has offered a more sober and questioning overview. Former Secretary of Nur Otan, Erlan
Karin, also questioned the reality of JK:
I am skeptical about the existence of so-called organization ‘Soldiers of the Caliphate.’ This organization
has claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks as in our country and in Afghanistan.54

French intelligence agencies had dismissed the
possibility of the group as a real terrorist organization
in one of its own investigations, as Karin adds, “this
again suggests that the organization even if it exists, is
more involved in PR for their brand, trying to create
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a specific request for information on their activities.”55
In Karin’s view, it remains too early to describe the
events in Kazakhstan in 2011-12 as “terrorism.”56
SPECIFIC FEATURES OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM
IN KAZAKHSTAN
One of the specifics of terrorism in Kazakhstan is
that it is mostly the law enforcement agencies (KNB
and MVD) that have been targeted.57 Another interesting feature is that there are no official statements or
claims from the alleged terrorists committing crimes
in Kazakhstan concerning their goals, interests, and
other required information. There is virtually no opportunity for communication or interaction between
the authorities and these alleged groups.
Other Kazakh experts note that, mainly in 2011,
terrorist acts committed in the country by “unprofessionals” stem from the socio-economic injustice and
poverty of the general population. The violence is a
demonstration of the protest against the state and official corrupt structures. Mainly Western Kazakhstan is
blamed for harboring certain violent extremist ideas,
even though the region is considered to be affluent because of its concentration of oil resources. The specific
features of Western Kazakhstan are the high unemployment level, huge gap between salaries (between
those who are employed at oil sites and other jobs), as
well as its geographical closeness to Russia’s NC and
the Karakalpakstan region of Uzbekistan, that tend
to spread fundamentalist ideas.58 To counteract this,
Karin argues that over the past 5-6 years, western and
southern, as well as central and northern Kazakhstan
have witnessed cases where extremists were detained
for spreading extremist/terrorist literature and gathering groups for unlawful activities.59
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Political Islam in CA is downplayed due to the absence of one centralized leader as well as any single
leadership in each country.60 For example, Kazakh experts claim that small jamaats are scattered across the
country, and their number and size of their membership are unknown. They have no center, nor a single
Amir, no clear hierarchy or structure, as well as no
logistical supply chain, as is the case in Afghanistan
and the NC.61 Karin says that “Kazakh terrorist acts”
do not originate from a single organization and seem
to be badly planned. No one knows their objectives
or what targets they would pursue in the future. He
propagates strong analytical work in the area.62
Patterns of Violence.
Despite the widespread publicity generated by the
attacks and the release of propaganda videos by JK,
it is worth noting that this is the only incident clearly
attributed to or claimed by this “group.” Moreover,
the exact nature of the incident points more toward
amateurism or inexperienced individuals rather than
those functioning within a sub-state group, properly
funded and trained for this type of activity; the damage to the target was low grade, suggesting a lack of
expertise in the handling of explosives.
Another instance of an individual accidently selfdetonating during a bomb making effort occurred in
Atyrau on September 5, 2012. Seven days later, police
and KNB members tried to arrest a number of suspects
believed to be linked to the explosion. Four other suspects were arrested on September 7. In the clash with
security forces that followed, five suspects were killed
and one wounded, and one member of the security
forces was wounded. Additional arrests followed this
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operation.63 On September 14-15, two men attacked
and wounded a police post in the Isataya-Mamambeta
square in Atyrau. Shortly after this incident, a group of
men attacked the local MVD headquarters in Atyrau,
throwing Molotov cocktails at the guards. Police and
MVD Berkut special forces conducted an operation
to detain the suspects involved in these incidents
on September 21; all four suspects were killed in the
operation.64
Indeed, this amateur theme carries through other
incidents in the 2011-12 narrative of political violence
in Kazakhstan. For example, on November 8, 2011, an
unidentified assailant shot and killed two policemen
as they stopped vehicles during a patrol of the Auezov
district of Almaty. Police witnessed the suspect and
an accomplice loading suspiciously large items into
the trunk of a car. By November 12, police arrested the
driver and three others, discovering small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition at the residence involved; however, there was no reported discovery of
Islamic extremist literature.65 In early-December 2011,
in the village of Boralday on the northwest outskirts
of Almaty, KNB Arystan special forces conducted an
operation to apprehend several suspects allegedly
involved in the shooting in Almaty on November 8.
A weapons cache was discovered, but no religious
literature was found.66
Incidents in Almaty in July 2012 appeared to follow
this pattern. On July 11, an explosion occurred at a
house in the village of Tausamaly (in the Almaty outskirts); the bodies of several people (including children) were found inside. A police search of the property reported finding weapons (AKS-74U and a few
pistols), bomb making materials, police equipment
(radios and traffic batons), as well as police and secu-
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rity services uniforms, and, on this occasion, some religious literature. The explosion was thought to have
been a bungled attempt at bomb making.67 On July 30,
2012, MVD Sunkar special forces and police conducted
an operation in the western part of Almaty to detain
several suspects involved in killing two police officers
on July 28. The operation led to an apartment building
being evacuated and the area sealed off; after several
hours the Sunkar unit stormed the building, killing six
suspects and no other casualties were reported. Small
arms, automatics weapons, and a “large amount” of
ammunition were discovered, but no extremist publications. The dead suspects were not believed by the
authorities to belong to any extremist group, but had
all served time in prison for various offences.68
On August 17, 2012, a police rapid response unit
carried out an operation in the Karasai District (Almaty Province, southwest of Almaty) to arrest a group of
criminals reportedly linked to an explosion in Tausamaly on July 11. The building was stormed and nine
people inside the house were killed, one of whom was
reportedly a child.69
However, the KNB came under high-level criticism following such incidents. In July 2012, President
Nursultan Nazarbayev called for “concrete measures”
to counter extremists and terrorists operating in the
country. Nazarbayev castigated the security forces
for their “unprofessionalism,” and failing to prevent
the explosion in the first place: “work is not done
properly.” Nazarbayev stated that:
As the president and guarantor of our constitution,
I am not satisfied with the work of law enforcement
agencies, particularly that of the KNB. The efforts we
are making are not efficient enough.70
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This critique of intelligence and security failure to
detect and disrupt the initial incident in the Karasai
district in the Almaty region on the previous day led
Nazarbayev to castigate the KNB and draw a more
general conclusion: “we are acting post factum all the
time.”71
While many of these incidents may in fact be linked
to criminal activity and bear no correlation to religious
extremism or terrorism, there was also another category—the lone crazed gunman. On November 12, 2011,
Maksat Kariev killed seven people in a series of attacks across the Taraz in Zhambyl Province (southern
Kazakhstan). No connection was discovered between
Kariev and extremist literature, though he reportedly
had military experience.72
Some Kazakhstani security specialists believe that
at its height, the radical underground in Western Kazakhstan numbered no more than 200, and JK, if it can
be established to have existed rather than serving as
an amorphous umbrella for the disaffected, may have
constituted as little as five members. One analysis puts
these extremists in a much wider context:
Jihadist hiding in Kazakhstan represents the armed
fundamentalist network organization, consisting of
the Jamaats, poorly interacting with each other, but
look to create a single network structure with a clear
hierarchy. The purpose of the organization is the overthrow of existing regimes in Central Asia and the establishment of Sharia in the region of the state—the
Central Asian Emirate. For example, Islam Tekushev,
the Chief Editor of the Caucasus Times argues that
armed jihadists of Kazakhstan are part of a wider extremist community whose aim is to establish a Central
Asian Imarat, which will include parts of Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.73
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This structure interacts with terrorist organizations
in the Middle East and NC. In the process of its formation, Kazakhstan’s underground at the same time
draws on the principles of organizations of all these
terrorist centers. This is due, first of all, to the geography of Kazakhstan, which was at the crossroads of
ancient civilizations of the world; at the intersection of
major transport arteries; and the economic, cultural,
and ideological relations between East and West.74

According to the KNB, law enforcement agencies
“failed to prevent 18 out of 53 extremist actions in
2011–2012.” The KNB claims that in this period “35
violent actions were averted,” and the activities of “42
extremist groups were neutralized.” Among the “18
violent extremist actions,” seven involved the use of
explosives.75 Reflecting on and assessing the patterns
and differences in these incidents of possible “terrorist” acts in Kazakhstan during 2011-12, it is possible to
draw the following observations:
•	
These acts of violence were unconnected to
each other and demonstrate no evidence of
what might be construed as a coordinated
campaign;
•	It is unclear whether all of these events constitute terrorism, or stem from criminal activity;
•	The targets of these attacks were KNB or government buildings and policemen;
•	Only one incident resulted in a “group” claiming responsibility;
•	The premature detonation of explosives does
not imply a high-level of training on the part of
the handlers;
•	Many of the suspects in these incidents were
later killed by security forces, though police
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had tried to talk to suspects before the storming
of premises was authorized;76
•	
Although security operations frequently uncovered arms caches, not all cases resulted in
finding banned religious publications;
•	
Motives for these crimes appear to be varied, but are inconsistent with known terrorist
models of targeting the wider public;
•	Though the security forces frequently suffered
casualties during operations, the follow-up
presence of special forces units minimized loss
of life on the part of security personnel;
•	There is no direct link between Islamic militants
operating in the North Caucasus, Afghanistan,
or elsewhere and these violent incidents in
Kazakhstan.
Thus, although Kazakhstan experienced an upsurge in political violence in 2011-12, there appears to
be no evidence to either support the idea that a professional and coordinated terrorist problem had emerged
within the country or that this was directly linked to
the insurgency in the NC. However, in terms of the
security response to this new threat, it is clear that after the authorities were taken by surprise, and early
operations were reactive and resulted in high rates of
fatalities among both suspects and the security forces,
a gradual transition occurred toward a softer interdiction-based approach.
In this context, it is also clear that the NC link to
these fledgling groups or individuals was taken less
seriously than were issues pertaining to Syria or Iraq.
For example, on July 21, 2014, the district court in Shymkent, southern Kazakhstan, sentenced four members of an alleged terrorist group with Syrian links.
Three of them, (A. Abdubaytov, S. Abdubaytov, and
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B. Bayzharkynov), were convicted of participating in
the terrorist group’s activities or in preparing acts of
terrorism, as well as in financing terrorist activities.
These were sentenced to 8 to 9 years in prison. The
group’s fourth member (M. Bekmurzayev) received a
5-year prison sentence for “illegally acquiring, carrying, and storing firearms as a member of the group.”
The four men were prosecuted for their activities from
October 2011 to November 2013, and had also allegedly taken part in the group’s activities in Syria.77
Indeed, despite the high profile emergence of ISIL
in Syria and Iraq, experts in Kazakhstan see no direct
threat posed by the very small numbers of the country’s citizens allegedly involved. Almaty-based political scientist Rustam Burnashev believes the group
poses only a threat within the Middle East, and sees
this as mainly related to Syria and Iraq for the foreseeable future.78 Calls to participate in Jihad, therefore,
will draw young disaffected youth to centers of conflict internationally, but while their numbers remain
very small in Kazakhstan, the authorities believe the
security threat to be low and certainly manageable.
STATE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM AND
EXTREMISM, 2011-13
One clear pattern that emerged in the wake of
these violent incidents in Kazakhstan in 2011-12 was
the avoidance of an over-reaction on the part of the
authorities; in other words, this did not result in passing draconian legislation or become an excuse for an
indiscriminate crackdown. In this sense, legislation
passed in the country dealing with religion, religious extremism, and terrorism must be viewed in a
much wider evolutionary context since independence
in 1991.
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Equally, the adjustments to national legislation in
response to these events seem rooted in longer-term
strategy and aim to deprive radicals of further easy
inroads into radicalizing Kazakhstani youth. The legislative and security response to the violent acts in this
period are therefore low key, and by no means represent a knee-jerk response or an attempt by the authorities to apportion blame wrongly.79
First, by drafting a revised law on terrorism, signed
into law in January 2013, whereby international experience for combating terrorism was taken into consideration, the law emphasizes respect and protection of
human rights in the state’s efforts to counter terrorism. The bill passed “On amendments and additions
to legislative acts on combating terrorism” is a departure from traditional regional approaches to counter
terrorism. Instead of placing the burden on the intelligence services and security forces alone, it expands
its basis to connect with civil society. It enshrines in
law a large-scale outreach, or information campaign,
to explain to the Kazakhstani public the following key
points: the dangers of terrorism, exposing its various
forms and mechanisms, the methods used by terrorists to recruit and disseminate their ideology of political violence, and consequently offers the development
of a “civic consciousness,” facilitating cooperation
between the security forces and citizens to reduce the
social basis of support for terrorism. It is this appeal to
civil society to help combat terrorism that makes this
law unique within CA.80
This envisages an information campaign to inform
the public about the dangers of terrorism, and includes
relevant contact with schools, colleges, and universities, and resulted in launching a website in December
2012 dedicated to promoting awareness of the terror-
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ist threat: www.counter-terror.kz. The 2013 Law on Terrorism, therefore, marks an important milestone in the
country’s development by linking counterterrorism to
respect for human rights. Moreover, the law allows
the government to reach out to and co-opt civil society
in an effort to reduce the scope of terrorist organizations, which seek to radicalize Kazakhstani society.81
By the fall of 2013, this was emerging more clearly
as part of a far-reaching effort to stem the potential
rise of domestic radicalism. On October 2, 2013, President Nazarbayev approved a state program on fighting religious extremism and terrorism for the period
of 2013–17. Central and local government bodies will
implement the program, while the then head of the
presidential administration, Karim Masimov, would
supervise its progress.
It involves the public in such preventative measures and in modernizing the informational work
among “target groups.” Its key is raising awareness of
the dangers of radical ideology while promoting education and informed discussion. One comment on the
decree states:
The program pays special attention to the attraction
of the community to participate in the preventive
work and modernization of communications and an
awareness-raising campaigning focused on target
groups. Most of the preventive measures set forth in
the program will be implemented for the first time in
Kazakhstan.82

These developments were also linked to the
growing role of the Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan Muslims (SDKM), the main religious body in
the country. Reportedly, the SDKM has launched a
national program to promote traditional Islam.
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According to the country’s chief mufti, Yerzhan
kazhy Malgazhyuly, the SDKM has formed six special groups to monitor the “religious situation” in the
regions. Each group consists of five people: “skilled
theologians and imams, who are well aware of the situation in the localities,” the mufti said. Malgazhyuly
explained that these groups have worked over the past
6 months among “people who need religious enlightenment,” including convicts, adding, “Work is also
under way among the youth to prevent the spread of
destructive movements and to explain the traditional
religious values.” Indeed, the cleric claims that the
campaign to date has persuaded “92 people” to quit the
Salafi movement and return to traditional Islam. The
groups visited 62 towns, 122 districts, 33 settlements,
200 higher and secondary educational establishments,
and 1,500 schools; most are located in the Western region of Kazakhstan—the area most prone to religious
extremism.83
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Astana’s reported initiatives and its references
to the counterterrorism and anti-extremism strategy
for 2013–17, allow a number of observations about
the state’s wider security policy. In particular, efforts
aimed at avoiding future radicalization of the country’s youth focuses on using the law, co-opting the
public into the process, improving religious education,
and offering warnings about the dangers of radical
ideologies. In other words, the security response has
matured to include a range of preventative measures
aimed at curbing problems in their early stages. Such
measures, moreover, also include a public information campaign. One striking feature in these efforts is
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the campaign to promote traditional Islam, something
the government has largely shied away from backing
in the past. Kazakhstan views these campaigns as necessary to avoid the radicalization of its young people
over the long term and within the domestic framework; and its policymakers appear to understand that
education will play a major prophylactic role in this
endeavor.
Clearly, given its unexpected experience of the series of violent acts in 2011-12 including suicide bombings, the state structures in Kazakhstan have gone
through a learning period. It is striking that, since
these events, the country has experienced no similar
incidents. This could imply that the movement or its
triggers have simply burned out, but it is more likely
that the absence of such outbreaks of violence is rooted
in a number of factors ranging from legal approaches
to improved standards of surveillance, detection, and
disruption. This is borne out by reference to a case
prosecuted in the criminal court in Atyrau Region in
September 2013. The court successfully prosecuted
nine Salifists on grounds of promoting terrorism,
inciting acts of political violence, conspiring to commit terrorist acts, and involvement in arms supplies
and production; these individuals received prison
sentences ranging from 6 to 14 years.84 But while a
learning curve was involved in improving state responses to the existence of such individuals or groups,
there were also, as this article argues, a number of
much deeper impediments to the radicalization of
Kazakhstani youth.
Nonetheless, risks remain as Kazakhstan’s younger
generation who were born in the immediate aftermath
of the Soviet Union’s collapse are now over 20 years
old. Furthermore, they experienced an ideological
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vacuum, together with increasingly poor quality education and all pervasive corruption which might entail
some unexpected results for the authorities in the future. For example, there are 12 percent to 15 percent
unemployed and 2.5 million to 2.7 million self-employed in Kazakhstan, which could become a potential
nourishing ground for extremists.85
•	Islam, as it is perceived in the Middle East/
Arab countries, has not embedded itself in Kazakhstan, either in the pre-Soviet Union era or
the present day.
•	Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar,
and Turkey each have clear interests in establishing their own Islamic traditions and integrating the Kazakhstani population deeper
into Ummah. They fund the construction of
mosques; finance students to study Islam in
their countries; and in some cases, dispatch their
preachers to preach in Kazakh mosques. Due to
their constant presence and regular funding, it
is possible that certain portions of the Kazakhstani population may become influenced by
these countries on how they perceive a traditional Muslim, which would contradict the normal lifestyle of an average Kazakhstani citizen.
The United States should closely observe and
monitor the activities of these countries, both
in Kazakhstan and within other Central Asian
countries, with regards to further religious
infiltration.
•	It is important to understand that the Kazakhstani population in general cannot read the
Koran in Arabic, and the preaching in Mosques
occur either in the Russian or Kazakh languages, which leaves scope for a degree of manipulation and misreading by interested parties.
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•	The Hadj, as well as fasting, has become fashionable among the population, many of whom
may not fully understand its religious and spiritual meaning. Thus, one should be careful to
avoid comparing Kazakhstani pilgrims in Mecca to those from Kuwait or Oman, for example.
•	There is a certain degree of Islamic revival taking place within a specific strata of the population, mainly the youth. Thus, Kazakhstan’s
population is becoming more Islamicized but
not radicalized, and the distinction should always be kept in mind.
•	
Kazakhstan’s experience of domestic public
violence in 2011-12 is unlikely to represent a
manifestation of domestic or internationally
orchestrated acts of terrorism, but the security
forces’ response reveals institutional weaknesses which can be corrected on the basis of tailoring specific U.S. security assistance programs
to address these issues.
•	
Kazakhstan has no durable and long standing links with NC Islamists; most of these assumptions are merely based upon geographical
proximity of the latter to Western Kazakhstan.
Another important point: when Russia claims
that Kazakhstanis are among NC terrorists,
they are usually ethnic Chechens, Dagestanis,
or Ingush who managed to obtain Kazakhstani
passports.
•	
An important weakness in the security response to many of these acts of public violence
relates to first responders. That is to say, when
the initial incidents occurred and the police
and other units arrived on the scene, these sustained the bulk of the authorities’ casualties.
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Once specialist and other elite units were deployed the suspects/perpetrators were quickly
eliminated. However, these units are not typically subordinated to the defense ministry, but
function under the KNB or the interior ministry. As a result, U.S. security assistance needs
to be matched to the needs of the end user and
avoid assuming that a military response in Kazakhstan to a domestic incident is restricted to
defense ministry forces or its elite units.
•	First responders in Kazakhstan in a suspected
act of terrorism or public violence caused by
criminal groups need better training and access
to fire support and coordination with other
ministries; such gaps in the U.S. training and
assistance offered to Kazakhstan must be addressed if this is to be easily remedied in the future. In practical terms, this involves the United
States sharing its experience on how its own
counterterrorist responses operate, with the
central point being that specialists need to be
involved at the outset, with local police playing
only a supporting role.
•	Prisons can serve as recruitment grounds for Islamic militants in Kazakhstan; thus the United
States should consider offering assistance and
training to address this, if such experience is
requested by the Kazakh government.
•	Since 9/11, Kazakhstan, among other states in
CS, has proved to be a reliable partner in the
War on Terror and a keen supporter of operations in Afghanistan. In light of the advances
and security threats posed in the Middle East
and elsewhere by ISIS and the reported involvement of Central Asian fighters including
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those from Kazakhstan, it will be even more
important to continue such security cooperation. Yet, this has to extend into deepening bilateral intelligence cooperation and offering
access to training and development programs
geared toward enhancing and fostering the
domestic intelligence and threat assessment
capabilities of Kazakhstan.
•	At the heart of further developing U.S. security
cooperation with Kazakhstan, based not only
on the findings of this monograph, there needs
to be a greater effort to build a common security language to reach an agreement of how
“terrorism” should be defined in order to better
support local capacities.
•	The radicalization of Kazakhstani youth, with
growing numbers joining ISIS, the Taliban, and
other Islamic terrorist organizations, is currently extremely sensitive for the government and
the leadership of the country, and will probably
remain so in the future. The authorities provide
little, if no, information to the population concerning the ongoing involvement of Kazakhstani fighters in Iraq and Syria. Consequently,
publicly available information is scarce. When
holding discussions with their Kazakhstani
counterparts, U.S. officials should handle such
conversations with great caution and vigilance.
At this stage, it is highly unlikely that Astana will be willing to share serious information concerning Kazakhstani fighters with its
foreign partners.
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This analysis has sought to assess soberly Kazakhstan’s evolving security environment in the context
of concerns over Islamic radicalization, and has highlighted a number of the barriers in the path of those
seeking recruits and to make headway in destabilizing
the country.
As this analysis demonstrates, the level of security
risk in Kazakhstan stemming from Islamic radicalization is mitigated by a large number of historical,
cultural, and recent legislative factors. These include
the fact that Kazakh identity has not been principally
shaped by Islam, which is reflected in the constitutional status as a secular country; the level of understanding traditional Islam in the country is open to question; Kazakh Muslims are mainly unable to read in
Arabic; anyone pursuing a level of genuine interest in
Islam will stand out in Kazakh society as its customs,
traditions, and family values do not assimilate these
theological precepts into daily life; imams teach in the
Kazakh language which compels Russian language
speakers to depend on assistance; legislation on religion and extremism more clearly sets the barriers, rendering the work of radicals easier to target, assess, or
limit; the population distrusts the official clergy; and,
finally, the instances of public violence in Kazakhstan
in 2011-12 were more likely to be linked to local criminality than to international or domestically inspired
terrorism. Indeed, the claims made by the criminal
culprits perpetrating such violent crimes, namely that
they found inspiration in international terrorist movements, only served as a veneer for their own grievances; these sporadic acts of violence therefore had little
to do with Kazakhstan experiencing a wave of genuine
terrorist acts.
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